Tuesday, February 18, 2025

The Titanic Paradox: When Aid Becomes an Ego Trip

 

Remember Slavoj Žižek's brilliant take on Titanic? The philosopher argued that Rose, the wealthy socialite, needed Jack's lower-class vitality to restore her ego and sense of purpose. Once Jack served his function of making her feel alive, the iceberg conveniently solved Rose's dilemma – saving her from the "dangerous" prospect of actually marrying someone beneath her station.

Sound familiar?

The recent freeze on USAID funding exposes a similar dynamic in international relations. The United States, like Rose, enjoys the moral superiority that comes with being the benevolent provider to lower-income countries. We get to feel generous, righteous, and important – until we don't.

With a simple executive order, the Trump administration threatened billions in aid programs across the world. Programs fighting HIV/AIDS, supporting vulnerable communities, and building infrastructure were suddenly left adrift. The message? These relationships exist at our convenience.

A federal judge may have temporarily thawed this freeze, but the damage to trust is done. The ease with which these commitments were discarded reveals the uncomfortable truth: much of our "aid" architecture may be more about feeding American ego than creating sustainable partnerships.

And let's be honest about what we witnessed with the USAID freeze – the casual flexing of imperial muscle. With a stroke of a pen, thousands of healthcare workers were dismissed, life-saving programs suspended, and decades of relationship-building jeopardized. Organizations like The AIDS Support Organization (TASO) in Uganda, which receives half its funding from USAID, were left scrambling as their clients faced "panic, fear, and anxiety" about continued access to treatment.

This cavalier approach to international commitments betrays a fundamental misunderstanding – or perhaps disregard – for what these relationships actually mean on the ground. When we speak of "foreign aid," we're not discussing abstract budget lines but real human lives interwoven with American promises. The ability to disrupt these relationships so abruptly suggests they were never valued as true partnerships to begin with.


The Savior Industrial Complex

American foreign aid has long suffered from what some critics call the "savior industrial complex" – the self-congratulatory notion that we are rescuing the less fortunate through our benevolence. This framing conveniently ignores the complex historical and economic factors that created global inequality in the first place, many of which involved American and Western exploitation of resources and markets.

When countries become dependent on American aid – often by design rather than accident – we create power dynamics that mirror colonial relationships. The provider maintains control, dictates terms, and can withdraw support at any moment. The recipient must remain grateful, compliant, and forever in our debt, both literally and figuratively. Is it any wonder that such arrangements breed resentment even as they create dependency?

Perhaps most disturbing is how easily global health initiatives became political pawns. HIV/AIDS programs that took decades to build, that represent significant diplomatic as well as humanitarian achievements, were imperiled overnight not because of their effectiveness or importance, but because they made convenient bargaining chips in domestic political games.

The 90-day review period announced by the administration wasn't about improving aid efficiency – it was theater. If genuine program improvement were the goal, targeted evaluations with contingency plans would have preceded any funding adjustments. Instead, we witnessed the diplomatic equivalent of flipping the game board because you're losing – regardless of the consequences for those relying on the outcome.

This episode highlights the fundamental double standard in how we approach international commitments versus domestic ones. Imagine if Social Security checks were suddenly frozen for 90 days while the government "evaluated the program." The political backlash would be immediate and severe. Yet when it comes to commitments made to international partners, we treat these promises as optional and conditional.

This double standard reveals a troubling hierarchy of whose lives and needs matter. American voters' immediate concerns trump the life-or-death healthcare needs of HIV patients in Uganda. This approach isn't just morally questionable – it's strategically shortsighted, eroding America's standing and influence abroad.

The damage extends far beyond the immediate program disruptions. We've created what might be called a "trust deficit crisis." Every current and potential international partner now must factor in the possibility that American commitments could vanish without warning. This uncertainty will make cooperation more difficult across every domain – from health initiatives to security partnerships to climate agreements.

The iceberg has revealed structural flaws in our approach. Now we must decide whether to address them or continue sailing toward disaster – this time with the whole world aboard.

Friday, February 7, 2025

The Cost of Consensus: Prabowo's 100 Days of Political Gluttony and Fiscal Fasting



In Indonesian politics, we seem to be experiencing what medical professionals might delicately call a case of institutional constipation. The body politic, swollen with the largest cabinet in our history—48 ministers and 56 deputy ministers—appears to be struggling with its basic functions. Like an overtaxed digestive system, the government has grown too large too quickly, gorging itself on political appointments and coalitions, while simultaneously attempting a puzzling feat: a massive Rp 306.69 trillion budget cut that seems to squeeze every ministry except its own bloated core. The symptoms are familiar to anyone who's ever suffered this uncomfortable condition: things move slowly, if at all, pressure builds up, and everyone pretends not to notice the obvious discomfort. The absence of meaningful opposition in parliament only adds to this peculiar political ailment—there's no natural mechanism to help things flow smoothly. President Prabowo's first 100 days present us with this paradox: a government that has expanded to unprecedented size while simultaneously trying to tighten its belt, creating a kind of institutional gridlock that nobody wants to discuss in polite company, but that we ignore at our peril.

The surgical precision with which Prabowo has wielded his budget-cutting scalpel would be almost admirable if it weren't so bewildering. Through Presidential Instruction No. 1/2025, he has prescribed a harsh diet for the bureaucracy—switching off air conditioners, herding civil servants into shared spaces lit only by natural light, and treating business travel as if it were a luxury spa treatment that must be rationed. The Finance Minister, Sri Mulyani, typically known for her steady hand at the tiller, now finds herself in the peculiar position of explaining why government offices must operate like austere monasteries while the cabinet continues to expand like a bureaucratic universe after the Big Bang. The stated purpose, we're told, is to redirect funds to Prabowo's flagship Free Nutritious Meals program, a noble cause that somehow requires both the largest cabinet in Indonesian history and civil servants working in semi-darkness. It's as if the government is attempting to diet while simultaneously preparing for a feast, counting calories with one hand while adding extra place settings with the other.

The most fascinating aspect of this fiscal theatrics isn't just the numbers—though Rp 306.69 trillion in cuts would make anyone's eyes water—but the political choreography behind it. While ministries scramble to slash their budgets by up to 58% in some cases, Prabowo has assembled what amounts to a political Noah's Ark, with nearly every party comfortably aboard his government vessel. The Interior Ministry cuts 57.46% of its budget while learning to love natural lighting, but apparently can't trim a single position from the unprecedented array of 104 ministers and deputy ministers. This isn't just regular political accommodation; it's political gluttony dressed up as fiscal responsibility. The opposition, what little existed of it, has been effectively digested into this expansive governmental body, leaving Indonesia's democracy in the curious position of having its largest-ever government and its smallest-ever opposition. It's as if we've built the most expensive consensus money can buy, only to discover we can't afford to keep the lights on.


Opposition forces

In the midst of this grand budgetary purge, one institution remains curiously untouched by the spirit of austerity: the parliament itself. While civil servants across Jakarta huddle in dimly lit offices and count their remaining business trip allowances like precious pearls, our representatives in the DPR continue their activities unperturbed by such earthly concerns as budget cuts. It's a telling exemption that speaks volumes about the current power dynamics in our democracy—those tasked with scrutinising the government's belt-tightening apparently don't need to tighten their own belts.

This parliamentary immunity to austerity might be more palatable if it came with robust oversight and vigorous debate. Instead, we're witnessing what might be the most compliant parliament in recent memory. The same political arithmetic that produced our supersized cabinet has effectively neutered parliamentary opposition. When the government announced its sweeping budget cuts, the response from parliament wasn't scrutiny or skepticism, but rather an eerie silence that would make a monastery seem rowdy by comparison. The Free Nutritious Meals program, despite its enormous price tag and complex implementation challenges, sailed through parliamentary discussions with barely a whisper of questioning. It's as if our legislative branch has transformed from a check on executive power into an elaborate rubber-stamping mechanism.

The implications for Indonesian democracy are profound and potentially long-lasting. When Terry Karl wrote about "imposed transitions" in 1990, he probably didn't envision a scenario where democratic institutions would be hollowed out not through outright authoritarianism, but through a kind of political osmosis—where opposition is absorbed rather than suppressed, and where acquiescence is bought with cabinet positions rather than enforced through coercion. The result is a peculiar form of democratic constipation where the normal push and pull of political debate, the healthy tension between government and opposition that keeps democracy regular and functioning, has been replaced by a kind of institutional paralysis masked as consensus. We've created a political system that's too bloated to move effectively but too well-fed to complain.

As we assess these first 100 days of Prabowo's presidency, we find ourselves in the grip of a peculiar political paradox. On the surface, we see a government preaching fiscal discipline while practicing political extravagance—a contradiction that would be comical if it weren't so consequential. The president's simultaneous moves to slash spending while maintaining the most bloated cabinet in Indonesian history isn't just an administrative curiosity; it's a symptom of a deeper democratic malaise. When civil servants are told that working in dark offices is an expression of patriotism while dozens of deputy ministers enjoy their new positions, we must question what kind of governance model is being constructed before our eyes.

The prescription for our current political constipation isn't simply more opposition for opposition's sake, nor is it blind acceptance of a government that speaks of efficiency while practicing excess. What Indonesia needs is a return to genuine democratic discourse—where budget cuts can be debated on their merits, where cabinet appointments serve governance rather than political accommodation, and where opposition isn't seen as an obstacle to be absorbed but as a vital component of democratic health. The risk we face isn't just fiscal inefficiency or administrative bloat; it's the gradual normalisation of a political system where consensus is manufactured through coalition-building rather than earned through debate and deliberation.

As Prabowo's government moves beyond its first 100 days, the true test won't be how much money it saves on electricity bills or how many civil servants it can fit into a sunlit room. The real challenge will be whether it can resolve the fundamental contradiction at its core: a government that grows larger while demanding others grow smaller, that preaches austerity while practicing excess, and that speaks of efficiency while embodying its opposite. Until then, Indonesia's democracy remains in an uncomfortable position—overfed but undernourished, expanding yet constrained, and desperately in need of the kind of political fiber that only genuine opposition can provide.


Tuesday, February 4, 2025

The Price of Tomorrow: Inside Indonesia’s Chinese-Powered Sprint to 2045 (article for The Carter Center, 04 February 2025)

 


My latest article published by The Carter Center as part of an exciting new series "Beneath the Winds: The U.S.-China Rivalry from Southeast Asia" in The Monitor:

https://uscnpm.org/2025/02/04/the-price-of-tomorrow/

My piece, "The Price of Tomorrow: Inside Indonesia's Chinese-Powered Sprint to 2045," examines the complex dynamics of China's massive investment in Indonesia's nickel industry and its far-reaching implications for our environment, society, and economic sovereignty. This article is part of a crucial initiative to amplify Southeast Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China rivalry. 

Saturday, January 25, 2025

New Publication (Cross-Party Presidential Dynasticism in Indonesia, Pacific Affairs, March 2025)

 


Excited to share that our article "Cross-Party Presidential Dynasticism in Indonesia" is now available as a pre-print in Pacific Affairs!

The article examines how President Jokowi's political dynasty is reshaping Indonesia's constitutional system through strategic coalition-building and institutional influence. 

The abstract is publicly available at: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/paaf/paaf, but full text is available only to subscribers.

I have a limited number of pre-print PDFs I can share with colleagues whose research aligns with these themes. If you're interested in receiving a copy, please send me email through rendypw@gmail.

Friday, November 29, 2024

Podcast People, Power, Politics

 


Excited to share my perspective on the latest episode (#25) of CEDAR's TagarPeoplePowerPolitics podcast! 🎙️
Duncan McCargo and I discussed our Journal of Democracy paper 'Southeast Asia's Toxic Alliances.' It was a great opportunity to explore and share our research findings on the complex political dynamics in Southeast Asia.
Special thanks to Petra Alderman for hosting such an engaging conversation! 

https://newbooksnetwork.com/how-are-southeast-asias-toxic-alliances-undermining-the-regions-prospects-for-democracy 

Sunday, November 24, 2024

Jokowi vs Megawati 2.0: A Rematch and A Post-Presidential Power Play

 


In Indonesian political theater, the encore often proves as compelling as the main act. Former President Joko Widodo's recent political maneuvering presents precisely such a spectacle, as he embarks on an ambitious campaign to prove his enduring influence in Indonesian politics. Just weeks after stepping down from the presidency, Jokowi has thrown himself into regional elections with characteristic vigor, backing candidates in direct opposition to his former party, PDI-P, in what amounts to a high-stakes game of political chess with his former patron, Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The stakes couldn't be higher. At its core, this is not merely about winning regional elections; it's about defining the post-presidential political landscape and determining who truly commands the loyalty of Indonesia's grassroots voters. Jokowi's aggressive endorsements of Ridwan Kamil for Jakarta and Ahmad Luthfi for Central Java represent more than mere political preferences—they are a direct challenge to PDI-P's traditional dominance and a bold statement about where power truly resides in Indonesian politics.

What makes this political drama particularly fascinating is its timing. Jokowi enters this fray having enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings during his presidency, backed by a devoted network of volunteers and a record of relative economic stability. Yet, he now operates without the formal trappings of presidential power. This presents a crucial test: Can Jokowi's personal brand, cultivated over a decade of pragmatic leadership, translate into raw political influence without the presidency's institutional backing?


Rematch: Jokowi vs Megawati 

Jokowi's enthusiastic campaign involvement may also stem from a deeper sense of frustration with the performance of his supported coalition. The "big-tent" approach—which brought together a bloated alliance of parties and political figures behind both Ridwan Kamil in Jakarta and Luthfi in Central Java—has thus far failed to generate the expected momentum. Recent polling data showing both candidates trailing their PDI-P-backed opponents suggests that merely assembling a broad coalition isn't enough to guarantee electoral success. This lackluster performance might explain Jokowi's decision to personally intervene, hoping that his direct involvement could provide the spark these campaigns desperately need. The situation eerily mirrors a common critique of such oversized coalitions: that they often prioritize elite accommodation over coherent messaging and grassroots mobilization. By stepping in personally, Jokowi appears to be attempting to compensate for the coalition's structural weaknesses with his own popular appeal—a high-risk strategy that simultaneously highlights both his potential influence and the limitations of traditional coalition politics.

The selection of battlegrounds is telling. Jakarta and Central Java aren't just any regions—they represent the very heart of Indonesia's political power structure. Jakarta, as the nation's capital and economic center, has always been a crucible for political ambitions. Central Java, meanwhile, stands as PDI-P's traditional stronghold, making Jokowi's intervention there particularly provocative. By backing Luthfi-Taj Yasin in what is essentially PDI-P's backyard, Jokowi is sending a clear message: no territory is off-limits in this power struggle.

But this gambit carries considerable risks. If his endorsed candidates fail to secure victories, it could severely diminish Jokowi's political capital at a crucial moment. The former president appears to be betting that his personal popularity—built on his trademark "blusukan" style of direct engagement with voters—can overcome the institutional advantages enjoyed by PDI-P's candidates. His recent campaign activities, from coffee shop meetings to market visits, suggest he's doubling down on the grassroots approach that defined his rise to power.

The conflict with Megawati and PDI-P adds another layer of complexity to this political chess match. Their relationship has evolved from one of political patronage to what appears to be open rivalry. This transformation reflects a broader tension in Indonesian politics between personal popularity and party machinery. Jokowi's decision to challenge his former party so directly suggests he believes his connection with voters transcends traditional party loyalties.

Yet, there's more at stake here than personal political capital. This power play could reshape Indonesia's political landscape for years to come. If Jokowi succeeds in demonstrating that his influence remains potent even after leaving office, it could establish a new model for post-presidential political engagement. Conversely, if his candidates falter, it might reinforce the traditional dominance of party structures over individual political brands.

The timing of these moves also hints at longer-term strategic considerations. With the 2029 presidential election already looming on the horizon, Jokowi's current maneuvering could be laying groundwork for future political plays. Success in these regional elections would position him as a kingmaker in national politics, potentially paving the way for his preferred candidates in future contests.

However, this strategy isn't without its critics. Some argue that Jokowi's aggressive involvement in regional elections so soon after leaving office risks undermining the democratic transition process. Others suggest that by opposing PDI-P so openly, he's burning bridges that might be needed for future political coalitions.

As Indonesia watches this political drama unfold, the fundamental question remains: Can Jokowi translate his unprecedented presidential popularity into lasting political influence? The answer will have profound implications for Indonesian democracy, potentially establishing new parameters for how former presidents can wield power in the post-presidential phase of their careers.

The coming weeks will prove crucial. As campaign seasons intensify and election day approaches, we'll see whether Jokowi's personal brand can truly transcend institutional power structures. Whatever the outcome, this bold political gambit has already reshaped the conversation about post-presidential influence in Indonesian politics.

For now, all eyes remain fixed on this high-stakes game of political chess, where a former president seeks to prove that even without the formal authority of office, his ability to shape Indonesia's political landscape remains undiminished. The results may well determine not just the future of regional leadership but the very nature of political influence in post-reform Indonesia.


The Titanic Paradox: When Aid Becomes an Ego Trip

  Remember Slavoj Žižek's brilliant take on Titanic ? The philosopher argued that Rose, the wealthy socialite, needed Jack's lower-c...