My commentary about the 2024 Jakarta's gubernatorial election was published in Fulcrum, please see full article here
Rendy Wadipalapa
Thursday, January 9, 2025
Beyond Democracy’s Return: Jakarta’s Gubernatorial Election and the Mutation of Toxic Alliances (Fulcrum ISEAS, 8 Jan 2025)
My commentary about the 2024 Jakarta's gubernatorial election was published in Fulcrum, please see full article here
Friday, November 29, 2024
Podcast People, Power, Politics
Excited to share my perspective on the latest episode (#25) of CEDAR's Tagar#PeoplePowerPolitics podcast! 🎙️
Duncan McCargo and I discussed our Journal of Democracy paper 'Southeast Asia's Toxic Alliances.' It was a great opportunity to explore and share our research findings on the complex political dynamics in Southeast Asia.
Special thanks to Petra Alderman for hosting such an engaging conversation!
https://newbooksnetwork.com/how-are-southeast-asias-toxic-alliances-undermining-the-regions-prospects-for-democracy
Sunday, November 24, 2024
Jokowi vs Megawati 2.0: A Rematch and A Post-Presidential Power Play
In Indonesian political theater, the encore often proves as compelling as the main act. Former President Joko Widodo's recent political maneuvering presents precisely such a spectacle, as he embarks on an ambitious campaign to prove his enduring influence in Indonesian politics. Just weeks after stepping down from the presidency, Jokowi has thrown himself into regional elections with characteristic vigor, backing candidates in direct opposition to his former party, PDI-P, in what amounts to a high-stakes game of political chess with his former patron, Megawati Sukarnoputri.
The stakes couldn't be higher. At its core, this is not merely about winning regional elections; it's about defining the post-presidential political landscape and determining who truly commands the loyalty of Indonesia's grassroots voters. Jokowi's aggressive endorsements of Ridwan Kamil for Jakarta and Ahmad Luthfi for Central Java represent more than mere political preferences—they are a direct challenge to PDI-P's traditional dominance and a bold statement about where power truly resides in Indonesian politics.
What makes this political drama particularly fascinating is its timing. Jokowi enters this fray having enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings during his presidency, backed by a devoted network of volunteers and a record of relative economic stability. Yet, he now operates without the formal trappings of presidential power. This presents a crucial test: Can Jokowi's personal brand, cultivated over a decade of pragmatic leadership, translate into raw political influence without the presidency's institutional backing?
Rematch: Jokowi vs Megawati
Jokowi's enthusiastic campaign involvement may also stem from a deeper sense of frustration with the performance of his supported coalition. The "big-tent" approach—which brought together a bloated alliance of parties and political figures behind both Ridwan Kamil in Jakarta and Luthfi in Central Java—has thus far failed to generate the expected momentum. Recent polling data showing both candidates trailing their PDI-P-backed opponents suggests that merely assembling a broad coalition isn't enough to guarantee electoral success. This lackluster performance might explain Jokowi's decision to personally intervene, hoping that his direct involvement could provide the spark these campaigns desperately need. The situation eerily mirrors a common critique of such oversized coalitions: that they often prioritize elite accommodation over coherent messaging and grassroots mobilization. By stepping in personally, Jokowi appears to be attempting to compensate for the coalition's structural weaknesses with his own popular appeal—a high-risk strategy that simultaneously highlights both his potential influence and the limitations of traditional coalition politics.
The selection of battlegrounds is telling. Jakarta and Central Java aren't just any regions—they represent the very heart of Indonesia's political power structure. Jakarta, as the nation's capital and economic center, has always been a crucible for political ambitions. Central Java, meanwhile, stands as PDI-P's traditional stronghold, making Jokowi's intervention there particularly provocative. By backing Luthfi-Taj Yasin in what is essentially PDI-P's backyard, Jokowi is sending a clear message: no territory is off-limits in this power struggle.
But this gambit carries considerable risks. If his endorsed candidates fail to secure victories, it could severely diminish Jokowi's political capital at a crucial moment. The former president appears to be betting that his personal popularity—built on his trademark "blusukan" style of direct engagement with voters—can overcome the institutional advantages enjoyed by PDI-P's candidates. His recent campaign activities, from coffee shop meetings to market visits, suggest he's doubling down on the grassroots approach that defined his rise to power.
The conflict with Megawati and PDI-P adds another layer of complexity to this political chess match. Their relationship has evolved from one of political patronage to what appears to be open rivalry. This transformation reflects a broader tension in Indonesian politics between personal popularity and party machinery. Jokowi's decision to challenge his former party so directly suggests he believes his connection with voters transcends traditional party loyalties.
Yet, there's more at stake here than personal political capital. This power play could reshape Indonesia's political landscape for years to come. If Jokowi succeeds in demonstrating that his influence remains potent even after leaving office, it could establish a new model for post-presidential political engagement. Conversely, if his candidates falter, it might reinforce the traditional dominance of party structures over individual political brands.
The timing of these moves also hints at longer-term strategic considerations. With the 2029 presidential election already looming on the horizon, Jokowi's current maneuvering could be laying groundwork for future political plays. Success in these regional elections would position him as a kingmaker in national politics, potentially paving the way for his preferred candidates in future contests.
However, this strategy isn't without its critics. Some argue that Jokowi's aggressive involvement in regional elections so soon after leaving office risks undermining the democratic transition process. Others suggest that by opposing PDI-P so openly, he's burning bridges that might be needed for future political coalitions.
As Indonesia watches this political drama unfold, the fundamental question remains: Can Jokowi translate his unprecedented presidential popularity into lasting political influence? The answer will have profound implications for Indonesian democracy, potentially establishing new parameters for how former presidents can wield power in the post-presidential phase of their careers.
The coming weeks will prove crucial. As campaign seasons intensify and election day approaches, we'll see whether Jokowi's personal brand can truly transcend institutional power structures. Whatever the outcome, this bold political gambit has already reshaped the conversation about post-presidential influence in Indonesian politics.
For now, all eyes remain fixed on this high-stakes game of political chess, where a former president seeks to prove that even without the formal authority of office, his ability to shape Indonesia's political landscape remains undiminished. The results may well determine not just the future of regional leadership but the very nature of political influence in post-reform Indonesia.
Thursday, November 14, 2024
Against Indonesia’s toxic alliances (New Mandala, 13 November 2024)
My latest analysis on Indonesia's evolving political landscape, building upon my previous work with Duncan McCargo on toxic alliances in Southeast Asian politics.
For the first time since the fall of the New Order, we're witnessing what appears to be an opposition-free political landscape, where even major parties like PDI-P face systematic pressure to conform.
And the Jakarta gubernatorial race will be a crucial test: Can these toxic alliances maintain their effectiveness at the regional level as they did in national politics?
https://www.newmandala.org/against-indonesias-toxic-alliances/
Friday, October 25, 2024
Prabowo and His Huge Political Debts to Jokowi
In the early days of Prabowo Subianto's presidency, his leadership approach is drawing attention for its distinctly military-like undertones, especially within his new ministerial cabinet, namely Red and White cabinet (Kabinet Merah Putih). As the former military general settles into his civilian role, Prabowo has introduced his Cabinet to a retreat at the Military Academy in Magelang, a setting rich with Indonesia's resistance history, where ministers and high-ranking officials engage in military-style drills and dawn awakenings led by bugle calls. It is somewhat attractive for public. It revives Prabowo old nationalist narratives. In mainstream media, we saw how most reports hailed such interesting approach.
While Prabowo has clarified that his intent isn't to militarise civilian governance (only for teamwork-building, discipline and so on, he said…), but such unusual approach highly connected to what Prabowo trying to say to us: this is my style, my government, so be it. So, this is one thing that might reflect a much deeper than only a cosmetical performance of military-style retreat: a strong intention to bring forth Prabowo’s own brand, his roots, his authenticity. We know this is a big problem for Prabowo as he for sure in huge political debts to Jokowi, the man who brought him into government in 2019, and later risked and gambled his reputation to paved the way for Prabowo and Gibran (Jokowi’s eldest son) victory in the 2024 presidential contest.
This sort of military aesthetics and theatrical of Prabowo's early presidential performance, while striking in its imagery, is thereby an important move for his brand. The military-style retreat at Magelang's Military Academy, complete with dawn bugle calls and formation drills, operates within a carefully curated environment where ministers still enjoy executive amenities, support staff, and high-end accommodations. This theatrical departure from Jokowi's civilian-oriented leadership style appears to be Prabowo's attempt to reclaim his previously dominant military persona: it’s a contradictory picture from his recent public image as the gentle, dance-prone "gemoy" (cuddly) grandfather figure that emerged during his alliance with Jokowi.
But this also presents a paradox: Prabowo leads an administration heavily indebted to his predecessor's political architecture, with retained ministers and coalition partners creating a complex web of obligations. The unprecedented scope of Prabowo's presidential authority, commanding Indonesia's largest-ever cabinet with 48 ministers and 88 additional high-ranking officials, is part of the debt itself. While on paper this extensive administration grants him extraordinary reach across Indonesia's political and economic landscape, the reality is more complex: this massive political machine was largely engineered through Jokowi's carefully orchestrated support system. The retention of 17 ministers from Jokowi's administration, the presence of Jokowi's son as Vice President, and the intricate web of political alliances forged during the transition period all point to a presidency that, despite its formal authority, operates within the framework of its predecessor's design.
This complex inheritance presents Prabowo with a fundamental challenge of political identity and autonomous leadership. His attempts to assert distinctiveness through military-style leadership theatrics and disciplined governance rhetoric show a deeper struggle to establish an authentic presidential persona independent of Jokowi's influence. The extended transition period from February to October 2024 further complicates this dynamic, as it allowed for deep entrenchment of continuity mechanisms that, while ensuring stability, potentially constrain Prabowo's ability to forge his own path.
Moreover, this complex patron-client dynamic raises fundamental questions about the nature of executive power in contemporary Indonesia. The presence of Jokowi's allies in key positions, while providing stability and continuity, potentially creates a dual power structure where presidential decisions must navigate both formal authority and informal obligations.
Therefore, rather than see it as a revival of neo-military-led political style and authoritarianism in Indonesian politics (which maybe true), the resurgence of Prabowo's military-influenced leadership style, while seemingly theatrical, may serve a crucial purpose in gradually distinguishing his presidency from Jokowi's populist-technocratic model. The carefully choreographed military ceremonies, dawn assemblies, and disciplined routines at the Magelang retreat represent more than mere spectacle—they constitute a deliberate attempt to reshape public perception and create psychological distance from Jokowi's more informal governance style.
However, the ultimate success of this rebranding strategy—and indeed, of Prabowo's presidency itself—will depend on his ability to transform symbolic gestures into substantive governance outcomes. The journey from being Jokowi's successor to becoming a distinctive president in his own right remains a work in progress, one where the military brand serves as just one tool in the broader challenge of crafting an authentic and effective leadership approach for Indonesia's complex political landscape.
Saturday, July 27, 2024
Partocracy in Regional Election (Op-ed Kompas, 27 July 2024)
Have you ever been confused by the inconsistent maneuvers of our political elites? They support each other one moment, then swiftly change their stance to antagonism: new alliances form with former adversaries, while old partnerships crumble. This political dance, as intricate as it is perplexing, plays out across various electoral arenas.
Here is my take on this depressing politics, published by Kompas: https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/07/25/partokrasi-dalam-pilkada
Friday, July 5, 2024
Journal Publication, SOUTHEAST ASIA'S TOXIC ALLIANCES, Journal of Democracy (Duncan McCargo & Rendy Wadipalapa)
We explore how 'toxic unity' rhetoric masks elite deals that subvert democracy without overt repression. Our research identifies seven key features of these alliances:
- Improbable bedfellows (e.g., Prabowo/Jokowi, Zahid/Anwar)
- Reputational whitewashing
- Clandestine deals (pardons, dropped cases)
- Hidden brokerage by behind-the-scenes actors
- Exclusionary agendas
- Discursive appeals
- Voter alienation
These Faustian pacts demand critical scrutiny. They turn elections into tools for undermining democratic processes and boost influence of extraconstitutional powers.
Download the open access here: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/930431
Beyond Democracy’s Return: Jakarta’s Gubernatorial Election and the Mutation of Toxic Alliances (Fulcrum ISEAS, 8 Jan 2025)
My commentary about the 2024 Jakarta's gubernatorial election was published in Fulcrum, please see full article here
-
In the early days of Prabowo Subianto's presidency, his leadership approach is drawing attention for its distinctly military-like unde...
-
Have you ever been confused by the inconsistent maneuvers of our political elites? They support each other one moment, then swiftly change t...
-
Under a bright and cheerful sky, three kids play on a slide in the park. But they have to decide who has the first turn. One told the othe...