Thursday, November 14, 2024

Against Indonesia’s toxic alliances (New Mandala, 13 November 2024)

 


My latest analysis on Indonesia's evolving political landscape, building upon my previous work with Duncan McCargo on toxic alliances in Southeast Asian politics.

For the first time since the fall of the New Order, we're witnessing what appears to be an opposition-free political landscape, where even major parties like PDI-P face systematic pressure to conform.
And the Jakarta gubernatorial race will be a crucial test: Can these toxic alliances maintain their effectiveness at the regional level as they did in national politics? 

https://www.newmandala.org/against-indonesias-toxic-alliances/ 

Friday, October 25, 2024

Prabowo and His Huge Political Debts to Jokowi

 

In the early days of Prabowo Subianto's presidency, his leadership approach is drawing attention for its distinctly military-like undertones, especially within his new ministerial cabinet, namely Red and White cabinet (Kabinet Merah Putih). As the former military general settles into his civilian role, Prabowo has introduced his Cabinet to a retreat at the Military Academy in Magelang, a setting rich with Indonesia's resistance history, where ministers and high-ranking officials engage in military-style drills and dawn awakenings led by bugle calls. It is somewhat attractive for public. It revives Prabowo old nationalist narratives. In mainstream media, we saw how most reports hailed such interesting approach.

While Prabowo has clarified that his intent isn't to militarise civilian governance (only for teamwork-building, discipline and so on, he said…), but such unusual approach highly connected to what Prabowo trying to say to us: this is my style, my government, so be it. So, this is one thing that might reflect a much deeper than only a cosmetical performance of military-style retreat: a strong intention to bring forth Prabowo’s own brand, his roots, his authenticity. We know this is a big problem for Prabowo as he for sure in huge political debts to Jokowi, the man who brought him into government in 2019, and later risked and gambled his reputation to paved the way for Prabowo and Gibran (Jokowi’s eldest son) victory in the 2024 presidential contest. 

This sort of military aesthetics and theatrical of Prabowo's early presidential performance, while striking in its imagery, is thereby an important move for his brand. The military-style retreat at Magelang's Military Academy, complete with dawn bugle calls and formation drills, operates within a carefully curated environment where ministers still enjoy executive amenities, support staff, and high-end accommodations. This theatrical departure from Jokowi's civilian-oriented leadership style appears to be Prabowo's attempt to reclaim his previously dominant military persona: it’s a contradictory picture from his recent public image as the gentle, dance-prone "gemoy" (cuddly) grandfather figure that emerged during his alliance with Jokowi. 

But this also presents a paradox: Prabowo leads an administration heavily indebted to his predecessor's political architecture, with retained ministers and coalition partners creating a complex web of obligations. The unprecedented scope of Prabowo's presidential authority, commanding Indonesia's largest-ever cabinet with 48 ministers and 88 additional high-ranking officials, is part of the debt itself. While on paper this extensive administration grants him extraordinary reach across Indonesia's political and economic landscape, the reality is more complex: this massive political machine was largely engineered through Jokowi's carefully orchestrated support system. The retention of 17 ministers from Jokowi's administration, the presence of Jokowi's son as Vice President, and the intricate web of political alliances forged during the transition period all point to a presidency that, despite its formal authority, operates within the framework of its predecessor's design.

This complex inheritance presents Prabowo with a fundamental challenge of political identity and autonomous leadership. His attempts to assert distinctiveness through military-style leadership theatrics and disciplined governance rhetoric show a deeper struggle to establish an authentic presidential persona independent of Jokowi's influence. The extended transition period from February to October 2024 further complicates this dynamic, as it allowed for deep entrenchment of continuity mechanisms that, while ensuring stability, potentially constrain Prabowo's ability to forge his own path.

Moreover, this complex patron-client dynamic raises fundamental questions about the nature of executive power in contemporary Indonesia. The presence of Jokowi's allies in key positions, while providing stability and continuity, potentially creates a dual power structure where presidential decisions must navigate both formal authority and informal obligations.

Therefore, rather than see it as a revival of neo-military-led political style and authoritarianism in Indonesian politics (which maybe true), the resurgence of Prabowo's military-influenced leadership style, while seemingly theatrical, may serve a crucial purpose in gradually distinguishing his presidency from Jokowi's populist-technocratic model. The carefully choreographed military ceremonies, dawn assemblies, and disciplined routines at the Magelang retreat represent more than mere spectacle—they constitute a deliberate attempt to reshape public perception and create psychological distance from Jokowi's more informal governance style.

However, the ultimate success of this rebranding strategy—and indeed, of Prabowo's presidency itself—will depend on his ability to transform symbolic gestures into substantive governance outcomes. The journey from being Jokowi's successor to becoming a distinctive president in his own right remains a work in progress, one where the military brand serves as just one tool in the broader challenge of crafting an authentic and effective leadership approach for Indonesia's complex political landscape.


Saturday, July 27, 2024

Partocracy in Regional Election (Op-ed Kompas, 27 July 2024)

Have you ever been confused by the inconsistent maneuvers of our political elites? They support each other one moment, then swiftly change their stance to antagonism: new alliances form with former adversaries, while old partnerships crumble. This political dance, as intricate as it is perplexing, plays out across various electoral arenas. 

Here is my take on this depressing politics, published by Kompas: https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/07/25/partokrasi-dalam-pilkada 

Friday, July 5, 2024

Journal Publication, SOUTHEAST ASIA'S TOXIC ALLIANCES, Journal of Democracy (Duncan McCargo & Rendy Wadipalapa)

 We explore how 'toxic unity' rhetoric masks elite deals that subvert democracy without overt repression. Our research identifies seven key features of these alliances:

- Improbable bedfellows (e.g., Prabowo/Jokowi, Zahid/Anwar)

- Reputational whitewashing

- Clandestine deals (pardons, dropped cases)

- Hidden brokerage by behind-the-scenes actors

- Exclusionary agendas

- Discursive appeals

- Voter alienation 

These Faustian pacts demand critical scrutiny. They turn elections into tools for undermining democratic processes and boost influence of extraconstitutional powers.

Download the open access here: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/930431 

Monday, June 24, 2024

Indonesia's political dynasty (Op-ed Kompas 24 June 2024)

 Accepting political dynasties as part of 'Asian values' is a lazy argument. More than that, this reasoning seems like an attempt to excuse political dynasties and accept them as an everyday fact. My latest op-ed, published by Kompas, aims to refute those apologetic arguments:  https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/06/23/memaafkan-dinasti-politik 

Thursday, May 9, 2024

The hope for Indonesia's oppositional forces (op-ed Kompas, 10/05/24)

 Indonesia needs strong opposition. But what kind of opposition? What is the possible, realistic projection of opposition amidst the aggressive promiscuous power-sharing and toxic alliance?

Here my latest op-ed published by Harian Kompas this morning (10/05):


Thursday, February 22, 2024

OP-ED, My Critique of Ulil Abshar Abdalla's op-ed (Kompas 22/02/2024)

 



This is my op-ed, published by Kompas this morning, criticizing Ulil Abshar Abdalla's article (15/02) about Prabowo Subianto's victory, which is very simplistic, biased, and premature. My writing dissects the fallacies in Ulil's thinking, as he presented three controversial propositions: 1) that the issue of democratic decline seems to be an elitist concern only; 2) that Prabowo's victory proves the broad public's preference for a continuity narrative à la Jokowi rather than a narrative of 'change' and reform; and 3) that the resilience of Indonesian democracy is commendable enough, and the death of democracy is an impossibility. The three propositions are very problematic because they overlook many factors. 

https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/02/20/sesat-pikir-tentang-demokrasi-indonesia?open_from=Opini_Page

Against Indonesia’s toxic alliances (New Mandala, 13 November 2024)

  My latest analysis on Indonesia's evolving political landscape, building upon my previous work with Duncan McCargo on toxic alliance...